

GARY A. RINI, M.F.S.

FORENSIC SCIENCE CONSULTANT

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CURRICULUM VITAE

1995 - Present *Forensic Science Educator, Trainer and Consultant* (International)
1996 - 2000 *Forensic Investigation Adjunct Instructor* - (Iowa Western Community College, IA)
1994 - 1995 *Police Division Commander* (Woodridge Police Department, Illinois)
1991 - 1994 *Forensic Services Manager* (Naperville Police Department, Illinois)
1988 - 1991 *Police Sergeant* (Denver Police Department, Colorado)
1984 - 1988 *Crime Laboratory Detective/Forensic Science Section* (Denver Police Department, Colorado)
1983 - 1984 *Police Officer* (Denver Police Department, Colorado)
1981 - 1983 *Police Agent/Crime Scene Investigator* (Lakewood Police Department, Colorado)
1975 - 1979 *Police Officer/Crime Scene Investigator* (North Olmsted Police Department, Ohio)
1972 - 1979 *Emergency Room Medical Corpsman* (United States Air Force/Ohio Air National Guard)

EDUCATION

The George Washington University - Master of Forensic Science (1981)
DePaul University - Master's Certificate in Administrative Foundations in Public Service (1993)
Northwestern University Center for Public Safety - Graduate of the School of Police Staff and Command (1993)
Roosevelt University - Graduate Coursework in Public Administration (1994)
Western Illinois University - Graduate Coursework in Law Enforcement Administration (1994 -1995)
Cleveland State University - Bachelor of Arts in Psychology and Criminal Justice (1979)
Kent State University - Undergraduate Coursework in Arts and Sciences (1969-1972)

FORENSIC SCIENCE GRADUATE COURSEWORK

Biological Aspects of Forensic Science	Forensic Anthropology	Forensic Medicine
Physical Aspects of Forensic Science	Personal Identification	Forensic Pathology
Questioned Document Examination	Forensic Photography	Criminal Law
Firearm and Toolmark Examination	Forensic Psychiatry	Criminal Law - Evidence

PROFESSIONAL AND FORENSIC ORGANIZATIONS

American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS)
American College of Forensic Examiners (Diplomate)
Association for Crime Scene Reconstruction (ACSR)
International Homicide Investigators Association (IHIA)
International Association of Bloodstain Pattern Analysts (IABPA)
International Association for Identification (IAI) - Life Active Member
Rocky Mountain Division of the International Association for Identification (RMDIAI) - Life Active Member
International Association for Property and Evidence (IAPE)
American Society for Quality (ASQ)

LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMIES ATTENDED

Denver (CO) Police Department Training Academy - Commencement Speaker (1983)
Lakewood (CO) Police Agent Academy - Commencement Speaker, Leadership Award (1981)
Ohio Police Officer Training Academy - Class Leader (1976)

FORENSIC EXPERT WITNESS QUALIFICATIONS

- Crime Scene Investigation and Death Scene Investigation
- Crime Scene and Shooting Scene Reconstruction
- Bloodstain Pattern Analysis and Luminol Processing
- Forensic Serology and Blood Alcohol Analysis
- Forensic Investigation and Examination

EXHIBIT
3

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FORENSIC ACTIVITIES

- *Visiting Professor of Law* - Francisco Marroquin University School of Law (2004 - Present)
- *Forensic Science Educator, Trainer and Consultant* (1995 - Present)
- *Member* - National Institute of Justice Technical Working Group on Crime Scene Investigation (1999 - 2001)
- *Director* - Criminal Investigation Training Institute (Metropolitan Community College 1999 - 2001)
- *College Instructor* - Department of Criminal Justice (Iowa Western Community College, IA 1996 - 1999)
- *College Instructor* - Department of Criminal Justice (Metropolitan Community College, NE 2001)
- *Regional Director of Training (Nebraska)* - American Society of Law Enforcement Trainers (1999 - 2001)
- *Board of Directors* - Nebraska Division of the International Association for Identification (1999 - 2001)
- *Forensic Science Training Consultant* - Powerphone, Inc. (Madison, Connecticut 1998 - 2000)
- *Program Developer* - Peavey Institute for Police Science (Lenexa, Kansas 1996-1997)
- *Volunteer Group Leader* - Douglas County (NE) Juvenile Diversion Program (1997)
- *Coordinator* - Felony Investigation Assistance Team (DuPage County, IL 1995)
- *Member* - Police Executive Research Forum (1992 - 1995)
- *Member* - International Association of Chiefs of Police (1994 - 1995)
- *Member* - Illinois Chiefs of Police Association (1994 - 1995)
- *Member* - DuPage County (IL) Senior Police Manager's Association (1994 - 1995)
- *Member* - Problem Housing Task Force (Woodridge, IL 1994 - 1995)
- *Member* - West Suburban (Chicago) Chiefs of Police Association (1992 - 1994)
- *Member* - Lake County (IL) Major Case Task Force (1993 - 1995)
- *Member* - Science and Practice Committee for Bloodstain Pattern Analysis (IAI 1993 - 1994)
- *Member* - American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (1991 - 1994)
- *Chairman* - Education and Training Conference for the Illinois IAI (1993 - 1994)
- *Chairman* - American Cancer Society's Jail and Bail Committee (Naperville, IL 1994)
- *Founder and Executive Vice-President* - Citizens Appreciate Police (Naperville, IL 1994)
- *Regional Vice-President* - International Association of Bloodstain Pattern Analysts (1988 - 1989)
- *Chairman* - Education and Training Conference for the IABPA (1988 - 1989)
- *Chairman of the Board* - Rocky Mountain Division of the International Association for Identification (1987)
- *President* - Rocky Mountain Division of the International Association for Identification (1986 - 1987)
- *Vice-President* - Rocky Mountain Division of the International Association for Identification (1985 - 1986)
- *Board of Directors* - Rocky Mountain Division of the International Association for Identification (1983 -1985)
- *Member* - Denver Police Department Peer Support Unit (1986 - 1990)
- *Member* - Human Relations Council Member (Ohio Air National Guard 1976 - 1979)
- *Member* - North Olmsted Police Department S.W.A.T. Team (1976 - 1979)
- *Member* - Westshore Enforcement Bureau S.W.A.T. Team (1976 - 1979)
- *Chairman* - Grievance and Negotiation Committee (North Olmsted Police Department - 1979)

FORENSIC SCIENCE COLLEGE COURSES DEVELOPED AND TAUGHT

- Crime and Science: An Introduction to Forensic Investigation
- Criminalistics
- Medicolegal Death Investigation
- Bloodstain Evidence
- Fingerprint Technology
- Crime Scene Search and Physical Evidence Management
- Forensic Evidence: An Introduction to Scientific Crime Detection

FORENSIC SCIENCE LECTURES TO UNIVERSITIES AND PROFESSIONAL AUDIENCES

- Luminol Processing
- Forensic Science
- Bloodstain Pattern Analysis
- Significance of Bloodstain Evidence in Criminal Investigations
- Crime Scene Investigation
- Crime Scene Issues for First Responders
- Death Scene Investigation

FORENSIC SCIENCE LECTURES TO UNIVERSITIES AND PROFESSIONAL AUDIENCES (CONT'D)

- Fingerprints
- Crime Laboratory Management
- Managing Forensic Investigations
- Forensic Investigation
- Bloodborne Pathogens
- Forensic Investigation Training Programs
- Forensic Science College Lecture Series (Iowa Western Community College)
- Forensic Evidence for Nursing and Allied Health Professionals
- Check Forgery and Handwriting Examination
- Crime Scene Issues in Homicide Cases: A Primer for the Criminal Trial Lawyer (CLE Class)

FORENSIC SCIENCE TRAINING PROGRAMS PLANNED AND PRESENTED

- Aircraft Crash Investigation (1985)
- Bloodstain Evidence (1986)
- Basic Crime Scene Investigation (1987)
- Institute on the Physical Significance of Bloodstain Evidence (1987)
- Demonstrative Evidence (1987)
- Practical Bloodstain Pattern Evidence (1987)
- Advanced Forensic Investigation (1988)
- Advanced Forensic Investigation (1992)
- Footwear Impression Evidence (1992)
- Basic Forensic Investigation Course (1993)
- Latent Print Photography Course (1994)
- Advanced Forensic Investigation (1994)
- Medicolegal Death Investigation (1997 a + b)
- Crime Scene Issues for First Responders (1997)
- Interviews and Interrogations (1997)
- Medicolegal Death Investigation (1998)
- Equivocal Death Investigation (1999 a + b)
- Death Scene Investigation (1999 a + b)
- Death Scene Investigation (2000 a + b + c + d + e + f)
- Crime Scene Issues in Homicide Investigations (2005 - 2006 a + b + c + d - 2007)

LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRAINING

- *Law Enforcement Management* - Western Illinois University Graduate School (1995)
- *Public Service Management* - DePaul University Graduate School (1992)
- *Human Resource Management* - Roosevelt University Graduate School (1994)
- *Accounting and Finance for Non-Financial Managers* - DePaul University Graduate School (1993)
- *Fundraising and Grantwriting* - DePaul University Graduate School (1993)
- *Civil Liability for Police Officers* - Western Illinois University Graduate School (1995)
- *Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Regional Meeting* - Evanston, IL (1994)
- *Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Regional Meeting* - Chicago, IL (1993)
- *Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Regional Meeting* - Naperville, IL (1992)
- *Management Training Forum* - Naperville, IL (1994)
- *Management Problems of the Technical Person* - Chicago, IL (1993)
- *Liability Issues Affecting Police Executives* - Chicago, IL (1993)
- *Police Civil Liability Course* - Schaumburg, IL (1994)
- *Developing Policies and Procedures* - Willowbrook, IL (1994)
- *Successful Grantwriting Course* - Northwestern University Traffic Institute (1994)
- *Internal Affairs Seminar* - Northwestern University Traffic Institute (1995)
- *Police-Media Relations* - Northwestern University Traffic Institute (1995)
- *Violence in the Workplace* - Oakbrook, IL (1995)
- *Criminal Justice Grant Writing Course* - Rolling Meadows, IL (1994)

LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRAINING (CONT'D)

- *Budget Preparation Workshop* - Chicago, IL (1991)
- *Trainer's Institute* - University of Nebraska at Omaha (1997)
- *Instructor Development Course* - Northwestern University Traffic Institute (1991)
- *Improving Supervision through Total Quality Management* - Naperville, IL (1993)
- *Leadership Supervisory Training Seminar* - Denver, CO (1989)
- *Dealing With Difficult Employees* - Northwestern University Traffic Institute (1994)
- *Police Supervision School* - Denver, CO (1989)
- *Stress Management Seminar* - Lake Shelbyville, IL (1994)
- *Basic Counseling Skills* - Denver, CO (1985)
- *Illinois Law Enforcement Training Board 40 Hour Firearms Course* - (1994)
- *Illinois Law Enforcement Training Board 40 Hour Law Review Course* - (1994)
- *Problem-Oriented Policing* - Northwestern University Traffic Institute (1994)
- *Assistant Tactical Firearms Instructor's Course* - Denver, CO (1990)
- *Officer Survival School* - Northwestern University Traffic Institute (1984)
- *Advanced Patrol Tactics and Techniques* - London, OH (1978)
- *Crime Reduction Course* - Federal Bureau of Investigation (1977)
- *Interviews and Interrogations* - LaVista, NE (1997)
- *Waste Isolation Pilot Program (Hazardous Materials)* - Denver, CO (1991)
- *AIDS Update* - Metropolitan State University, Denver, CO (1986)
- *Bloodborne Pathogen Training Course* - Chicago, IL (1991)
- *Bloodborne Pathogen Training Course* - U.S. Department of Justice (1992)
- *Bloodborne Pathogen Training Course* - Chicago, IL (1992)
- *Bloodborne Pathogen Training Course* - Elgin, IL (1994)
- *Tuberculosis Training Course* - Elgin, IL (1994)
- *AIDS and the Law* - DePaul University Graduate College of Law (1995)
- *ISO 17025 Accreditation Training* - Forensic Quality Services (2010)

FORENSIC SCIENCE CONTINUING EDUCATION COURSES

- *Practical Homicide Investigation* - Coral Springs, FL (2012)
- *Homicide Investigation* - Institute for Police Technology and Management (2012)
- *Homicide Investigation* - Case Western Reserve University Law-Medicine Center (1979)
- *Death & Homicide Investigation* - Henry C. Lee Forensic Science Institute (2012)
- *Medicolegal Death Investigation* - St. Louis University Medical School (1982)
- *Medicolegal Death Investigation* - University of New Mexico Medical School (1982)
- *Advanced Homicide Investigation* - Wichita, KS (1989)
- *Advanced Homicide Investigation* - Little Rock, AR (1996)
- *Death Investigation Course* - Little Rock, AR (1998)
- *Forensic Entomology Workshop* - University of Illinois, Chicago (1993)
- *Forensic Dentistry Course* - Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D.C. (1981)
- *Identification of Human Remains* - Denver, CO (1986)
- *Fingerprint Classification School* - F.B.I., London, OH (1982)
- *Fingerprint Classification School* - F.B.I., Buffalo Grove, IL (1992)
- *Advanced Latent Fingerprint School* - F.B.I., London, OH (1982)
- *Advanced Latent Fingerprint School* - F.B.I., Naperville, IL (1992)
- *Latent Fingerprint Development School* - Colorado Bureau of Identification (1983)
- *Crime Scene Investigation Course* - Lakewood (CO) Police Department (1981)
- *Crime Scene Investigation Course* - Sirchie Crime Labs, Raleigh, North Carolina (1982)
- *Crime Scene Investigation Course* - Denver Regional Council of Governments (1982)
- *Crime Scene Investigation Course* - National Law Enforcement Institute (1982)
- *Crime Scene Investigation Course* - Denver Police Department (1987)
- *Crime Scene Investigation Course* - University of Arkansas at Little Rock (1996)
- *Crime Scene Issues for the First Responder* - UALR Criminal Justice Institute (1996)
- *Crime Scene Issues for the First Responder* - Council Bluffs, Iowa (1997)

FORENSIC SCIENCE CONTINUING EDUCATION COURSES (CONT'D)

- *Emergency Crime Scene Responder* - Mineral County, Nevada (1998)
- *Crime Scene Photography Course* - Denver, CO (1982)
- *Criminalistics Seminar* - Greeley, CO (1986)
- *Forensic Evidence & Managing Forensic Investigations* - Little Rock, AR (1998)
- *Aircraft Crash Investigation* - Denver, CO (1985)
- *Sex Crimes Investigator's Course* - Greeley, CO (1982)
- *Sex Crimes Investigator's Course* - Glenwood Springs, CO (1988)
- *Forensic Serology Course* - F.B.I. Academy, Quantico, VA (1987)
- *Semen Analysis Course* - Serological Research Institute, Emeryville, CA (1987)
- *Bloodstain Evidence Course* - Denver, CO (1986)
- *Bloodstain Pattern Investigation* - University of Arkansas (1986)
- *Bloodstain Pattern Investigation* - Valencia Community College, Orlando, FL (1986)
- *Bloodstain Evidence Institute* - Corning, NY (1987)
- *Bloodstain Evidence Institute* - Denver, CO (1987)
- *Bloodstain Evidence Institute* - Corning, NY (2010)
- *Advanced Bloodstain Evidence Institute* - Corning, NY (1987)
- *Practical Bloodstain Pattern Investigation* - Douglas County, CO (1987)
- *Detection of Blood at the Crime Scene* - Denver, CO (1988)
- *Basic Bloodstain Pattern Interpretation* - Little Rock, AR (1998a)
- *Basic Bloodstain Pattern Interpretation* - Little Rock, AR (1998b)
- *Advanced Forensic Investigation Course* - Denver, CO (1988)
- *Advanced Forensic Investigation Course* - Naperville, IL (1992)
- *Advanced Forensic Investigation Course* - Naperville, IL (1994)
- *Advanced Forensic Investigation Course* - University of Arkansas at Little Rock (1996)
- *Forensic Hair and Fiber Course* - F.B.I. Academy, Quantico, VA (1989)
- *International Symposium on Forensic Hair Analysis* - F.B.I. Academy, Quantico, VA (1985)
- *International Symposium on Forensic Immunology* - F.B.I. Academy, Quantico, VA (1986)
- *International Symposium on Blood Alcohol Analysis* - F.B.I. Academy, Quantico, VA (1986)
- *American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Annual Training* - F.B.I. Academy, Quantico, VA (1992)
- *American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Annual Training* - F.B.I. Academy, Quantico, VA (1993)
- *Demonstrative Evidence Seminar* - Denver, CO (1987)
- *Evidence and Recovered Property Course* - Bridgeview, IL (1994)
- *Arizona Identification Council Annual Training Seminar* - Scottsdale, AZ (1995)
- *Violent Crime Investigation* - Oak Brook, IL (1996)
- *Law Forum* - Council Bluffs, IA (1996)
- *Forensic Investigation Lecture Series* - Council Bluffs, IA (1996)
- *Nebraska Division of the IAI Spring Training Conference* - Mahoney State Park, NE (1997)
- *Nebraska Division of the IAI Spring Training Conference* - Mahoney State Park, NE (2000)
- *Forensic Evidence Course* - Little Rock, AR (1998)
- *Questioned Document Training Course* - U.S. Secret Service, Glynco, GA (1999)
- *Document and Voice Examination Course* - American Institute of Applied Science (2000)
- *Questioned Document Course* - American Institute of Applied Science (2000)
- *Forgery and Questioned Document Course* - University of Houston (2000)
- *Advanced Forgery and Questioned Document Course* - University of Houston (2000)
- *International Association of Bloodstain Pattern Analysts Annual Training Conference* - Tucson, AZ (2004)
- *National Rifle Association Certified Firearm Instructor's Course (Pistol)* - North Olmsted, OH (2010)
- *National Rifle Association Certified Range Safety Officer Course* - Grafton, OH (2011)
- *Shooting Reconstruction Course* - Henry C. Lee Forensic Science Institute, New Haven, CT (2010)
- *Shooting Reconstruction Course* - Northwestern University Public Safety Institute, IL (2010)
- *Shooting Reconstruction Course* - West Virginia University, WV (2011)

FORENSIC SCIENCE PUBLICATIONS AND TRAINING MANUALS

- "Fill-Flash Photo Luminescence to Photograph Luminol Bloodstain Patterns", *Journal of Forensic Identification*, (May/June 1989), Gary A. Rini and Fred E. Gimeno.
- "Video Documentation of the Enhancement of Luminol Tests by Means of Light Amplification" *Unpublished Report Presented to the IABPA Fall Training Conference*, (1988), Gary A. Rini and Paul M. Selander
- "A Single Drop of Blood May Determine the Outcome of the 'Trial of the Century'", *The Daily Hound* (April 1996)
- "Evaluating the Luminol Response in Suspected Bloodstains", *The Daily Hound* (June 1996), Lynn Peavey Co.
- *Forensic Identification Next-of-Kin Data Kit (F.I.N.D. Kit)*
- *Child F.I.N.D. Identification Planner (Child F.I.N.D. Kit)*
- *A Model Policy for Bloodborne Pathogen Risk Reduction*
- *An Overview of OSHA's Bloodborne Pathogen Standard*
- *Fingerprint Training Manual*
- *Latent Fingerprint Processing of Vehicles*
- *Luminol Processing*
- *Significance of Bloodstain Evidence in Criminal Investigations*
- *Crime Scene Search and Physical Evidence Management*
- *Basic Forensic Investigation*
- *Advanced Forensic Investigation*
- *Forensic Science Administration*
- *Managing Forensic Investigations*
- *Crime and Science: An Introduction to Forensic Investigation*
- *Crime Scene Issues for First Responders*
- *Forensic Evidence for Law Enforcement Officers*
- *Forensic Evidence for Nursing and Allied Health Professionals*
- *Basic Bloodstain Pattern Interpretation*
- *Death Scene Investigation*
- *Crime Scene Issues in Homicide Cases: A Primer for the Criminal Trial Lawyer*

PROFESSIONAL AWARDS RECEIVED


- *Leadership Award* - Lakewood, CO Police Department (1981)
- *Award of Appreciation* - Rocky Mountain Division of the I.A.I. (1987)
- *Distinguished Service Cross* - Denver Police Department (1988)
- *Award of Appreciation* - International Association of Bloodstain Pattern Analysts (1988)
- *Officer of the Month* - Denver Optimist Club (1989)
- *Lifesaving Award* - Denver Police Department (1989)
- *Who's Who in American Law Enforcement* (1981)
- *Award of Appreciation* - Midwest Homicide Investigator's Association (1994)
- *Public Service Award* - Cook County, IL Sheriff's Police Department (1994)
- *Meritorious Service Award* - Naperville, IL Police Department (1994)
- *Award of Appreciation* - Citizens Appreciate Police (Naperville, IL) (1994)
- *Award of Appreciation* - Illinois Division of the I.A.I. (1994)
- *Award of Appreciation* - Naperville YMCA (1994)
- *Award of Appreciation* - Arizona Identification Council (1995)
- *Law Enforcement Commendation Award* - Sons of the American Revolution (Chicago, IL) (1995)
- *Over 100 Letters of Commendation for Public and Professional Service* (1972 - Present)

EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY

- Testimony given in Federal, State, Military and Municipal Courts, Grand Juries and Coroner's Inquests
- Courtroom Testimony given in AL, CO, DC, FL, IA, IL, KY, MO, ND, OH, PA, SD, TX, VA, WI, WV and Israel
- Depositions given for cases in CO, FL, IL, IA, MD, MO, NE, OH, OK and VA

Case Review and Evaluation

State of Ohio vs. Stanley Jalowiec



Gary A. Rini, M.F.S.
Forensic Science Consultant

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North Olmsted, Ohio 44070

Toll Free 1-800-268-6301

Case Review and Evaluation
State of Ohio vs. Stanley Jalowiec

June 22, 2012

Kimberly S. Rigby, Esq.
Assistant State Public Defender
Office of the Ohio Public Defender
250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400
Columbus, Ohio 43215

Re: Case Review and Evaluation (State of Ohio vs. Stanley Jalowiec)

Dear Ms. Rigby:

I.) At your request, I have reviewed the case material you provided to me that is associated with the above-captioned case. Specifically, you requested that I address three issues of concern regarding the investigation of this case. These issues of concern are:

- The seating capacity of the 1994 Chrysler Lebaron convertible allegedly used to transport the decedent and assailants involved in this case from Elyria, Ohio to a Cleveland, Ohio cemetery where the decedent's (Ronald J. Lally) body was discovered.
- An analysis of the alleged criminal events and the correlation of the physical evidence documented from the scene, vehicle and the decedent.
- The handling of the confidential informant involved in this case as opposed to law enforcement's recognized standards for managing confidential informants.

II.) The case material you provided for my review included the following items:

- Cleveland Police Department supplemental reports (January 19, 1994),
- Cuyahoga County Coroner verdict report (Elizabeth K. Balraj, M.D.),
- Ronald J. Lally autopsy report,
- Photocopies of black and white Photographs of 1994 Chrysler LeBaron Convertible,
- Affidavit of Hetzel See, Jr.,
- Affidavit of Melissa Arroyo,
- Transcript of Elyria Police Department November 29, 1995 Melissa Arroyo interview,
- Affidavit of Leroy Riddick, M.D.,

- Transcript of Heather Neilson Raaf, M.D. trial testimony,
- Transcript of Linda Luke trial testimony,
- Transcript of Sharon Hopkins trial testimony,
- Automotive consumer's guide to 1994 Chrysler LeBaron convertible,
- Cleveland Police Department color crime scene photographs.

III.) The first issue of concern, the seating capacity of the 1994 Chrysler Lebaron convertible: A computer search for the manufacturer's data sheet for this vehicle resulted in the location of the Consumer (Automotive) Guide found at:

<http://consumerguideauto.howstuffworks.com/1990-to-1995-chrysler-lebaron-coupe-convertible-6.htm>

This vehicle was designed for four (4) passengers. If there were more than four adult male passengers seated in the vehicle, it is most likely that at least one passenger would have to be seated on another passenger. In addition, a "MAPQUEST" search for a travel route from the last known address mentioned in the case material ("Mom's Open Kitchen Restaurant"), located at 346 Broad St, Elyria, OH 44035-5504, to the site of the Woodland Cemetery (where Lally's body was discovered) 6901 Woodland Ave, Cleveland, OH 44104, was a distance of 30.93 miles with a stated driving time of 37 minutes. As this event occurred in the month of January, with snow on the ground, it is highly unlikely that four adult males in addition to Ronald J. Lally (78" and 210 lbs.) would have travelled that distance together in the same 1994 Chrysler LeBaron convertible.

IV.) The second issue of concern was a correlation of the physical evidence from the scene, the vehicle and Lally's body with the alleged activities surrounding Lally's death:

- The bloodstain evidence documented at the scene, and in the 1994 Chrysler Lebaron convertible allegedly used to transport Lally to the cemetery, demonstrates that Lally met his death at the cemetery, and was not killed elsewhere and transported and dumped at the site at which he was discovered.
- The abrasions documented on Lally's body could have been caused by his being dragged along the surface of the cemetery roadway (see Raaf testimony and Riddick affidavit)
- Although the scene was not thoroughly documented photographically, there is photographic documentation of apparent "tire spin marks" in the snow, which are consistent with having possibly been made by the front-wheel drive 1994 Chrysler LeBaron convertible used to transport Lally to the cemetery, as it allegedly was backing up to run over Lally.
- In addition, handgun parts were located and documented at the scene indicating the possibility of a dismantling of a handgun at the scene.


- There was no documentation of tire tread marks located on Lally's body or clothing, and no indication of crushing wounds (associated with a vehicle running over Lally) mentioned in the autopsy report.

V.) Hetzel See, Jr. should be commended for the moral and ethical courage he displayed by coming forward and breaking the "blue wall of silence" regarding the handling of confidential informants by members of the Elyria Police Department. If his allegations are true (see Hetzel See, Jr. affidavit) actions taken by members handling confidential informants in this case may, indeed, rise to the level of a criminal conspiracy. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) published a document (see attachment) that outlines recommendations of how law enforcement agencies should handle and control confidential informants. Again, if the allegations are true, there was an apparent willful disregard of these nationally established policies and procedures in this case.

VI.) The opinions expressed in this report are based on a review and evaluation of the material submitted for evaluation and the information provided by/through Kim Rigby. Should additional relevant information or evidence become available, or if the direct examination of physical evidence related to the event is conducted, the conclusions reflected in this report may need to be modified to incorporate the new information or evidence.

These conclusions are based on knowledge drawn from personal investigative experience, relevant law enforcement training, forensic science education and practical research and published standards for performance, and are consistent with the standards and practices currently employed in crime scene analysis.

Respectfully,



Gary A. Rini, M.F.S.
Forensic Science Consultant
Cleveland, Ohio

Attachments: IACP Training Key #404 (Confidential Informants)
Gary A. Rini (CV)
Gary A. Rini (Testimony)



Training Key® #404

Confidential Informants

Confidential informants can provide investigators with specific information that is simply not available from other sources. At the same time, informants are often criminals. They can render a law enforcement investigation useless, destroy an agency's credibility, and endanger officers' lives if not properly managed. For these and other reasons, the undercover operation, including the use of confidential informants, should be used only with proper controls.

To be of value as a confidential informant (CI), a person should have one or more of the following characteristics. A good CI:

- Knows, has been associated with, or has intimate knowledge of one or more active criminals.
- Is associated with, or has intimate knowledge of, persons practicing a crime specialty such as bank robbery, drug sales, or perpetrating crimes in a specific geographic area.
- Has an occupation or residence that lends itself to gathering information about criminals and their plans to commit crimes.
- Has status in the criminal justice system, that is, is on pre-trial release or bail; probation or parole; convicted pending sentencing; incarcerated; or other status.

In addition, the CI should meet three criteria before performing work for the law enforcement agency. He should:

- Be willing to work under the direction of an investigator and to perform certain lawful acts as directed.
- Be willing to exchange information for monetary or other lawful consideration.
- Be a private citizen and not a member of a law enforcement agency.

Based on these qualifications, a confidential informant could be defined as a private citizen who has entered into a confidential agreement with a law enforcement agency to provide information about criminals or criminal activity in exchange for monetary or other consideration.

Even when CIs are not criminals themselves, their association with criminals demands utmost caution in using and rewarding them. The law enforcement agency can begin taking the necessary precautions by developing sound informant control procedures. Specific recommended procedures will be

discussed and referenced throughout this *Training Key*. To be able to control CIs, however, it is important to first understand what motivates them.

What Motivates Informants?

It is often said that law enforcement must retain the "upper hand" in dealing with informants, but accomplishing this is not a simple matter of exerting authority. Further, a written agreement, while necessary, may hardly be considered binding by an informant who has strong incentives to see that others - including law enforcement - are exploited.

Understanding what motivates the CI, therefore, can be the key to retaining control over his activities. Before enlisting the services of a CI, the investigator must determine not only who the individual is, but also why he wants to become an informant. Further, these perceived motives must be monitored over time. A change of motivation may alert investigators to potential problems in the way the CI is operating, or may signal the CI's desire to end the relationship with the agency.

There is considerable agreement among law enforcement professionals on the reasons individuals become informants. Among the most significant motivators are the following:

- **Money.** One caution here is that when information is scarce, the CI may become "creative" to maintain the flow of funds.
- **Revenge, Spite, or Retaliation.** This includes mistreatment by associates, jealousy, and quarrels.
- **Elimination of Competition.** Diversion of suspicion is another aspect of this motivating factor.
- **Fear.** This may range from fear of current or former associates to fear of law enforcement officers, with the fearful CI seeking protection from the law enforcement agency.

- *Self-aggrandizement.* Some CIs seek to enhance their image or sense of self-importance. There will be obvious difficulties in ensuring that such persons keep their identities confidential.
- *Prosecutorial or Judicial Leniency.* Serious problems can occur when an investigator makes promises of leniency that the agency is not authorized to keep.
- *Repentance.* Some agencies choose to avoid repenters because they doubt their sincerity or perceive them as emotionally unstable.

Finally, it is important that the investigator accept whatever motivations the CI has and either work within that context, or choose not to contract with the individual.

Problems with Informants

Investigators must treat CIs courteously, develop a trust-based relationship with them, offer encouragement and praise, and make it clear that the agency has high expectations of them. But successfully directing and monitoring CIs also requires that officers never put their full trust or safety in informants' hands and that they have an acute awareness of potential problems such as those described below.

Lying. CIs may exaggerate or fabricate the criminal acts of targets. Some may report truthfully, but may lie about having used illegal methods to obtain the information. Their motives may range from wanting to receive high marks from officers to fancying themselves "super sleuths."

Double-Dealing. CIs can make deals with targets as easily as they can with the police, and use both sides to their advantage. They may be faithful to neither side, yet remain trusted by both. CIs may provide criminal associates with information about the identity of undercover agents, cars they drive, hours they work, their tactics, and agency procedures. Further, they may be plants who continue their criminal activities and monitor police operations while eliminating competitors. Money may be the motive for addicts, gamblers, and alcoholics to get involved in double-dealing. Other CIs may do so to help cover their informant activities or ingratiate themselves with criminal associates.

Rip-offs. The CI is in a position to arrange rip-offs of large flash rolls. They have been known to sell government property used in investigations or to pledge it as collateral for loans. They may sell the same information to two different agencies, causing them to unwittingly conduct simultaneous investigations. A major violator arrested by one agency may sell information to another agency about a relatively minor operation, and receive a lenient sentence for doing so.

Blackmail. Officers who get too close to informers may begin to sympathize with their problems and bend the rules. Eventually, the CI may "get something" on the officer, who loses control and, in effect, is directed by the CI.

Despite the problems and risks associated with CIs, their use can be effective and may be the only way to reach a particularly important target. Generally, CIs are most productive in connection with consensual crimes, such as drug sales and trafficking, fraud, and other white collar crimes.

Criminals are well aware that informants are widely used. Although they may condemn informers and vow never to become one, the majority will "turn" if given the opportunity.

With the priority status currently given drug-related crimes, the use of confidential informants can be expected to

increase. If the practice is accepted as a necessary evil, then it is incumbent on law enforcement agencies to institute the necessary controls, protect and support its investigators, and understand the legal limitations involved in using informants. Some key issues related to using confidential informants are discussed below.

Who "Owns" the Informant?

Investigators may be reluctant to maintain department files on informants they use. They may fear that potential informants will not participate if they know records of their activities will be on file. They may not believe departmental security procedures will be effective in protecting informants' identities, and may even fear that incompetent or corrupt law enforcement personnel will gain access to their informants' names. Some may fear that a supervisor or another investigator will destroy a trust relationship built with a considerable investment of effort and time.

Notwithstanding these concerns, the department, rather than the individual investigator, must ultimately control use of informants. As the discussions on CI characteristics and motives suggest, CIs present significant risks to the integrity of investigations and to officer safety. The department must ensure that CIs are sufficiently discouraged from committing crimes, and that entrapment is avoided. In addition, the department as a whole has an interest in seeing that important CI information is available to all personnel with a need to know. The agency is also responsible for ensuring that buy money is used appropriately and accounted for properly.

The potential for corruption is inherent in any law enforcement activity conducted in secret. The department must protect itself against the possibility that officers may explain corrupt activities by claiming their criminal associates were informers.

In addition, the department has an overriding interest in the mental health and safety of its investigators. An alert, well-trained supervisor may recognize problems with a CI's behavior that the investigator does not. Similarly, the supervisor may determine that an investigator is identifying too closely with the CI or a criminal lifestyle, or is under excessive stress because of an association with a CI.

Finally, establishing an informant file system as noted later can help protect CI's identities and ensure that informant information will be put to the best legal use possible.

Legal Use of Informant Information

It is essential that law enforcement officers understand how the concept of probable cause may be developed for lawful arrests and searches involving the use of CIs. While hearsay is admissible to establish probable cause, the legal determination of probable cause requires detailed knowledge of the objective information and the source of the information.

In *Aguilar v. Texas*, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the U.S. Supreme Court created a two-part test for establishing reliability in a case where information received from a confidential informant was the basis for probable cause for a warrant. This required (1) establishing the credibility of the informant, and (2) establishing the reliability of the informant's information. The informant's credibility might be evidenced by his track record of providing information that led to a certain number of arrests and convictions. For a CI with no track record, credibility

might be established by the CI's having admitted to a crime. Establishing the reliability of the CI's information could be accomplished by stating the CI had direct knowledge of the facts.

Later, *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), which expressly overruled the Aguilar test, established the "totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether probable cause exists. In this case, an anonymous letter was considered adequate to establish probable cause. The letter contained no information that established the CI's credibility; rather, credibility was inferred from the level of detail the letter provided. *Gates* eliminated the requirement that both parts of the Aguilar test - reliability and basis of knowledge - be met for an affidavit based on CIs hearsay. Currently, while a clear demonstration of the CI's reliability will reduce the need to show the CI's basis of knowledge; a detailed basis of knowledge might conversely eliminate the need to demonstrate past reliability. Thus, under *Gates*, courts will look to the strength of corroboration to satisfy probable cause in the absence of a showing of the CI's honesty, truthfulness, or basis of knowledge.

In the vast majority of cases that involve CIs, every effort is made to keep them out of the courtroom. However, when the CI must appear as a witness, the control officer, that is, the CIs primary law enforcement contact, will need to ensure the CI is well prepared. Accurate department records are essential in preparing the CI for intense questioning in court. Questions must be anticipated about the CI's background, details of the CI's relationship with the defendant, specifics about the department's relationship and transactions with the CI and, in drug cases, a host of additional questions regarding drug transactions and their documentation.

Law enforcement officers and prosecutors adamantly object to disclosure of the CI's identity at trial, but this position is not always upheld. Disclosure will depend on the circumstances of each case. The courts will attempt to strike a balance between the need to protect both the CI and the law enforcement agency's need for informants, and the defendant's right to a fair trial. When the court determines the CI's identity is essential to a finding of probable cause, his identity must be disclosed or the evidence suppressed. When ordered to produce a CI in a hearing or trial for questioning by defense counsel, the law enforcement agency and prosecutor's office must weigh the ramifications of disclosure of the CI's identity against the damage of terminating the charges and case.

In determining the usefulness of a CI's testimony to the defense, some jurisdictions conduct in-camera hearings, where the trial judge questions the CI in private about the nature of the CI's possible testimony.

In general, officers need not reveal a CI's identity on applications for arrest or search warrants, particularly when the "totality of the circumstances" attests to the presence of probable cause. However, in this and all other legal matters, the agency should consult counsel well-versed in applicable federal, state, and local law.

Problems for the Agency, Supervisor, and Investigator

There are essentially three types of pitfalls that can negate the possible benefits of using confidential informants. The first type concerns an agency's readiness to use CIs to full ad-

vantage. The second concerns the supervisor's readiness to direct, control, and evaluate CI-related activities. The third type concerns the investigator and whether he is prepared to assume the responsibilities of control officer.

Agency Pitfalls. After an agency decides to use CIs, the agency can fall into five major traps. The first is a failure to issue written directives that set forth policies and procedures. Agencies can avoid this pitfall by developing sound informant control procedures.

The second pitfall is a failure to define roles and responsibilities of all persons in the chain of command, from the CEO to the investigator. The agency should clearly defined roles in several key areas:

- The CEO or designee should approve all requests to use an informant classified as unreliable.
- Access to informant files should be restricted to the CEO, the commander of criminal investigations, or their designees.
- The commander of criminal investigations should be responsible for developing and maintaining master informant files and an indexing system.
- The commander of criminal investigations should approve all requests from sworn personnel to review an individual's informant file.
- An authorized supervisor must approve any officer's use of an individual CI.
- Whenever possible, an officer shall be accompanied by another officer when meeting with a CI.

Some investigators can be expected to disagree with the last item requiring accompaniment to CI meetings. Ideally, the officer who recruited the informant should be the designated control officer and should be responsible for directing and monitoring the CI. Whether that officer should work the CI alone, or should do so as part of a two-officer team, has been a subject of debate.

Those who favor the one-officer approach cite these advantages: CIs who are particularly sensitive about confidentiality may be more likely to cooperate; the potential for cooperation conflicts is reduced; and more information or cooperation may be forthcoming. While exceptions may be necessary, in the two-officer approach a more objective relationship with the CI can be maintained; set-ups are more easily avoided; and a better assessment of CI performance results. Two-officer meetings are essential when the CI and control officer are of the opposite sex, when the CI is a juvenile, and when the CI presents other exceptional risks (e.g., is suspected of trying to set up the control officer; is emotionally unstable; is a substance abuser, is on probation or parole; or has a reputation for perjury, bribery, or related offenses). Agencies that permit an officer to meet with a CI alone should require a contact report immediately after each meeting.

The third potential agency pitfall is a failure to orient and train its personnel in techniques for working with CIs. Too frequently, officers pay insufficient attention to giving CIs a good cover, use risky procedures to communicate with them, fail to evaluate whether the CI can do what is asked, and fail to take security and confidentiality measures that help assure the long-term value of the CI. Investigators do not come with an innate ability to manage informants effectively without training. Failure to provide officer training may jeopardize investigative efforts and officer safety, as well as negate the time, effort, and resources invested in developing the CI Training

should include a thorough briefing on agency policies, procedures, and required documentation; and explicit instruction on recruiting CIs, directing and monitoring CI activities, interviewing and debriefing informants, preparing informants for court, evaluating CI performance, and other topics.

The fourth and fifth potential problems are failures to orient and train CIs in what is expected of them (including an explicit set of "do's and don'ts"); and failure to execute a written agreement with CIs. The investigator should thoroughly review each provision of the agreement with the CI, placing particular emphasis on the following points:

- Informants have no law enforcement powers and are not permitted to carry weapons while performing activities as informants.
- Informants will be arrested if found engaging in any illegal activity, and will receive no special legal considerations.
- Informants will not take, and the department will not condone, any actions that may be considered entrapment.

There are obvious risks to the agency's credibility, officer safety, the integrity of individual cases - as well as liability concerns - when CIs misrepresent themselves as officers or commit crimes. The first point, that CIs are not law enforcement employees, should be reinforced by several specific items in the informant agreement. For example, in the agreement the CI should affirm his status as an independent contractor, and acknowledge that as such he is not entitled to Workers' or Unemployment Compensation. The agreement should also prohibit the CI from using the agency as an employment or credit reference without prior approval.

Entrapment is a frequently used defense in drug cases. Entrapment occurs when the government plans the offense and induces someone to commit it someone who would not have otherwise done so except for the government's persuasion, fraud, or trickery. If a CI entrapment or appears to entrap a defendant, the court may throw out all or part of the case. Further, to prove that entrapment did not occur, the CI may have to testify, thereby revealing his or her identity.

Certain illegal actions on the part of an informant may raise the defense of "outrageous conduct," which is related to entrapment. The defense may assert that the government's conduct was so outrageous or shocking to fundamental fairness that due process would bar a conviction. For example, the CI may become overinvolved in the criminal activity of the target.

In addition to the agreement, a more explicit list of "do's and don'ts" should be prepared and reviewed with the CI and can be incorporated by reference in the agreement. Finally, training for CIs should address the CI's specific objectives, compensation procedures, communication with and reports to the control officer, cover stories, security, legal constraints, and other topics.

Supervisory Pitfalls. Pitfalls in four main areas could cause problems for supervisors. Such as:

- Poor selection of an informant, or poor selection of an informant to work with a given investigator;
- Failure to provide adequate direction and control regarding investigator/CI interactions;
- Failure to take extraordinary precautions in cases involving "special CIs"; or
- Failure to periodically evaluate activities and results

Avoiding the first two pitfalls on informant selection and control entails (1) ensuring that supervisors receive the training needed to execute their responsibilities effectively; and (2) establishing procedures that require a supervisor to provide initial approval before an officer uses an individual as a CI.

"Special CIs" include those of the opposite sex of the investigator, juveniles, and CIs who are in or out of custody pending a prosecutorial or judicial outcome.

Juveniles should be used only in accordance with relevant department regulations and state laws. Further, whenever a juvenile is used as a CI the agency should obtain a completed consent form signed by the juvenile's parent or legal guardian. If the juvenile is a ward of the court or has charges pending, court permission is also required. Most agencies require the concurrence of the commanding officer or a supervisory officer before a juvenile CI can be used.

Similarly, a series of special permissions will be required before probationers and parolees can be used. Some states prohibit use of these individuals as CIs. Supervisors should be trained in these requirements, and should be responsible for ensuring that their investigators comply with them.

The fourth pitfall for supervisors concerns a failure to periodically evaluate activities and results. Departments should ensure that their existing reporting requirements and inspection policies are adequate to cover the sensitive area of managing CIs, and make adjustments as necessary.

Investigator Pitfalls. In general, potential problems for investigators tend to fall into five categories. These include:

- Failure to maintain a professional relationship with the CI;
- Gullibility, and a failure to fully question the CI about his activities and seek corroboration from other sources;
- Making promises that the agency cannot keep regarding large money payments or favorable prosecutorial or judicial outcomes;
- Lack of sufficient attention to handling money and property, especially controlled substances; and
- Failure to adequately document CI activities

CI Information and its Management

There are four basic uses for an informant file system.

- Provide a source of background information about the informant.
- Provide a complete history of the information received from the informant.
- Enable review and evaluation by the appropriate supervisor of information given by the informant.
- Minimize incidents which could be used to question the integrity of investigators or the reliability of the CI.

Key Elements of an Informant File System. Master informant files should be established - one on confidential informants and one on unreliable informants - and an indexing system should be developed and maintained. These files should be established under the direction of the commander for criminal investigations. Within the master files, a separate folder should be maintained on each CI used by officers. Each of these individual files should be coded with an assigned informant control number.

Essentially, the master files on confidential informants are the operational or "working files." Included in each CI's file are the signed informant agreement, briefs of information pro-

vided, and indications of the information's reliability. These individual files also contain the informant's name and other identifiers (fingerprints, photograph, criminal history record). The CI's status as active or inactive should be clearly indicated. If a CI is determined unreliable, that CI's folder should be placed in the master file on unreliable informants.

For the indexing system, a summary should be prepared to correspond to each CI file. These summaries are coded with the informant's control number, but do not include the informant's name or photograph. They do include details about the CI's appearance, age, marital status, special skills, current place of employment and residence, and others.

Using Informants. Before a potential CI is approached, the supervisor should provide authorization, which should entail a determination that the candidate is not working for another investigator and has not been deemed unreliable. A CI file should be opened only after the officer has conducted a background investigation and an authorized supervisor has approved the CI.

Using Unreliable Informants. Some CIs may be extremely reliable (e.g., they always follow procedures, keep appointments, handle money responsibly), but seldom produce information that is relevant or sufficiently accurate. Others may be considered unreliable (e.g., they endanger an officer or engage in criminal activity), but deliver consistently accurate information or have unusual access to an important target. Thus, in certain exceptional situations, it may be productive to use a CI who has been deemed unreliable. The decision to use an unreliable CI should be made only by the CEO or designee after determining that the potential outcome is worth the extraordinary risks involved.

Securing CI Files. Tight security of CI files is imperative for officer and CI safety, and to ensure the integrity of the entire informant management system. CI files should be maintained in a secured area within the criminal investigations section. Access should be restricted to the CEO, commander of criminal investigations, or their designees. A written request from other sworn personnel should be approved by the commander of criminal investigations before access to an individual informant's file is permitted. Of course, informant files should be closed to the public. Other precautions may include:

- Keeping the files in locked cabinets segregated from any other files and under the control of a supervisor.
- Requiring that all files removed from the storage area be returned by the close of business hours.
- Auditing the files (e.g., semi-annually) to ensure they are maintained properly and that security procedures are being followed.

Acknowledgement

This *Training Key*® was prepared from material in "Confidential Informants" by Barbara Webster of the Institute for Law and Justice, Alexandria, VA. The document was published as a Concepts and Issues Paper through the IACP/BJA National Law Enforcement Policy Center.

questions

The following questions are based on material in this *Training Key*®. Select the best answers.

1. Which of the following statements is true?
 - (a) *Understanding what motivates an individual to be an informant is critical to retaining control over his activities.*
 - (b) *Some individuals may become informers in order to eliminate their criminal competition.*
 - (c) *If information is scarce or unavailable, some informants may fabricate information to continue receiving payment.*
 - (d) *All of the above are true.*
2. Which of the following statements is false?
 - (a) *Law enforcement officers should retain informants only with departmental knowledge and approval.*
 - (b) *Access to informant files should be limited to the chief executive officer, commander of criminal investigations, or their designees.*
 - (c) *In general, officers must reveal a confidential informant's identity on applications for arrests or search warrants.*
 - (d) *The case of Illinois v. Gates established the "totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether probable cause exists for a warrant based on informant information.*
3. Which of the following statements is true?
 - (a) *Whenever possible, an officer should be accompanied by another officer when meeting with an informant.*
 - (b) *Informants who have been classified as "unreliable" should never be used.*
 - (c) *Written informant agreements are of no value since informants are basically untrustworthy.*
 - (d) *All of the above are true.*

answers

1. (d) All of the statements are true.
2. (c) Normally it is not necessary to identify an informant on an arrest or search warrant application; an officer need only establish by the "totality of the circumstances" that probable cause exists.
3. (a) Whenever possible, an officer should be accompanied when meeting with an informant.

have you read...?

"Managing Confidential Informants," Institute for Law and Justice, 1018 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA 22314.

This document provides a discussion of training topics on managing informants and presents a model training curriculum.



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EXPERT TESTIMONY (2003 – PRESENT)

1. State of Ohio v. Keith Crabbs, OH (2012) - Homicide/ Motions Hearing / Criminal/Defense³
2. United States v. ITC Rodney Williams, Norfolk Naval Station, VA, (2011) - Homicide/ Trial/Criminal/ Defense¹
3. State of Texas v. John Gerard Quinn, TX (2011) - Aggravated Assault to Police Officer/Trial/Criminal/Defense¹
4. Estate of Robert Wone v. Price, et. al., MD (2011) - Wrongful Death/Deposition/Civil/Defense²
5. State of Missouri v. Keith Carnes, MO (2009) - Homicide/Deposition/Criminal/Defense²
6. State of West Virginia v. William Echard, WV (2008) - Homicide/Motions Hearing/Criminal/Defense³
7. State of West Virginia v. William Echard, WV (2008) - Homicide/Motions Hearing/Criminal/Defense³
8. Hitchcock v. Marion County Sheriff's Office, FL (2008) - Wrongful Death/Trial/Civil/Defense¹
9. State of Ohio v. Hank Wells, OH (2008) - Felony Traffic Violations/Deposition/Criminal/Defense²
10. The People of Israel v. Timer Ben Yerek Daulbiev, Israel (2008) - Homicide/Trial/Criminal/Defense¹
11. Estate of Kyle Wasson v. City of North Liberty, et al., IA (2008) - Wrongful Death/Trial/Civil/Plaintiff¹
12. State of Ohio v. Bobby Lee Cutts, Jr., OH (2008) - Homicide/Trial/Criminal/Defense¹
13. Estate of Salvatore Culosi v. Fairfax County, et al., VA (2007) - Wrongful Death/Deposition/Civil/Plaintiff²
14. United States v. Calvin E. Hill, Boling AFB. DC (2007) - Homicide/Trial/Criminal/Defense¹
15. Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Jerry Bernard Winstead, Jr., KY (2007) - Homicide/Trial/Criminal/Defense¹
16. Hitchcock v. Marion County Sheriff's Office, FL (2007) - Wrongful Death/Deposition/Civil/Defense²
17. Estate of Kyle Wasson v. City of North Liberty, et al., IA (2007) - Wrongful Death/Deposition/Civil/Plaintiff²
18. United States v. Brian G. McCoy, ND (2006) - Homicide/Trial/Criminal/Defense¹
19. United States v. Tamara Azure, SD (2006) - Homicide/Evidential Hearing/Criminal/Defense³
20. State of Wisconsin v. Derek Anderson, WI (2006) - Homicide/Trial/Criminal/Defense¹
21. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Smart, PA (2004) - Homicide/Trial/Criminal/Defense¹
22. State of West Virginia v. Yasser Abdelhaq, WV (2004) - Homicide/Trial/Criminal/Defense¹
23. State of Ohio v. Anton D. Hamilton, OH (2003) - Homicide/Trial/Criminal/Defense¹
24. People v. John Cumbee, IL (2003) - Homicide/Trial/Criminal/Prosecution¹

[Note: Total times expert testimony provided since 1984 = 120]

Trial Testimony¹
Deposition Testimony²
Other³